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United States District Court
Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FOOD & WATER WATCH, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. [17-cv-02162-EMC](#)

**ORDER DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
RELIEF**

Docket No. 265

In November 2016, Plaintiffs filed their original petition asking Defendant EPA to conduct rulemaking to prohibit the addition of fluoridation chemicals to drinking water supplies, which the EPA denied on February 17, 2017. *See* Docket No. 265 (“Mot.”) at 1. Plaintiffs promptly filed suit in this Court shortly thereafter. *See* Docket No. 1. (“Compl.”).

On August 10, 2020, after a bench trial, this Court issued an order holding all proceedings in abeyance in order to “afford the EPA an opportunity to consider the significant scientific developments that have occurred since the original petition was filed.” Docket No. 262 (“Abeyance Order”) at 5.

On October 28, 2020, almost eighty days after this Court issued its abeyance order, the EPA filed the instant “motion for relief” from the abeyance order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). *See* Mot. The gravamen of the motion is that the Court erred because it “should have dismissed this case for lack of jurisdiction, but instead has permitted Plaintiffs an opportunity to create standing where none exists.” *Id.* at 1. The EPA asks this Court to vacate its abeyance order and dismiss this case with prejudice. *Id.*

1 Importantly, on November 4, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental petition¹ with the EPA
2 requesting that the EPA reconsider its earlier denial in light of new information, including:

3 “1) the trial record together with Plaintiffs’ admitted exhibits and
4 summary of the record; 2) the MIREC and ELEMENT studies; 3)
5 the pooled BMD analysis of the MIREC and ELEMENT data; 4) the
6 National Toxicology Program’s revised draft monograph containing
7 a systematic review of the fluoride literature; 5) a published
8 statement from former NTP director Dr. Linda Birnbaum, about the
9 ‘consequential’ findings of the NTP’s revised monograph; 6) the
10 facts to which the parties stipulated at trial; and 7) several orders of
11 this Court which reject legal positions that EPA relied upon in its
12 denial of the initial petition.”

13 See Docket No. 272 (“Opp’n”) at 2. In other words, the EPA is now able fully to reconsider its
14 denial of Plaintiffs original petition, which is why this Court issued the abeyance order in the first
15 place.

16 The EPA’s instant motion for relief from the abeyance order is improper for several
17 reasons. First, the motion is procedurally improper because Rule 60(b)(6) only offers relief from
18 final judgments or orders, not from interlocutory orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (“On motion
19 and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a *final* judgment,
20 order, or proceeding for . . . any [] reason that justifies relief.” (emphasis added)); *Banister v.*
21 *Davis*, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1710 (2020) (“A Rule 60(b) motion . . . attacks an already completed
22 judgment.”); Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1946 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (“The
23 addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of the judgments, orders or
24 proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and hence interlocutory judgments are not
25 brought within the restrictions of the rule.”); *Mateo v. M/S KISO*, 805 F. Supp. 761, 786 (N.D.
26 Cal. 1991) (“Rule 60(b) motions apply only to final judgments, however, and not to interlocutory
27 rulings.”); *Kraft v. Old Castle Precast Inc.*, No. LA CV 15-00701-VBF, 2016 WL 4120049, at *2

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¹ The Court’s abeyance order directed Plaintiffs to file a *new* petition with the EPA. See Abeyance Order at 4. Plaintiffs explain, however, that they filed a supplemental petition instead “after further research revealed that it was EPA’s practice to consider second petitions seeking identical relief as ‘motions for reconsideration.’” See Docket No. 272 (“Opp’n”) at n. 1 (citing cases). Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, the supplemental petition is procedurally appropriate because it “did not seek new relief.” *Id.* at 2. Whether the supplemental petition is procedurally improper or not is for the EPA—not this Court—to decide in the first instance.

1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016), *aff'd sub nom.*, 700 F. App'x 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A motion under Rule
2 60(b) or Rule 59(e) is only appropriate when final judgment has been entered on all claims.”
3 (quoting *Panarello v. City of Vineland*, No. 12-4165 (RBK/JS), 2016 WL 3638108, *5 (D.N.J.
4 July 7, 2016)).

5 Second, the EPA’s motion is improper even if the Court construes it as a motion for
6 reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-9. As an
7 initial matter, Local Rule 7-9(a) only allows parties to file motions for reconsideration with leave
8 of court. See Civ. Loc. R. 7-9(a) (“No party may notice a motion for reconsideration without first
9 obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.”). Here, the EPA filed its motion without obtaining
10 leave of court, improperly styling it as a “motion for relief.”

11 More importantly, motions for reconsideration are only appropriate under three
12 circumstances:

13 (1) “a material difference in fact or law exists from that which was
14 presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for
15 which reconsideration is sought;” (2) “the emergence of new
16 material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such
17 order;” or (3) “a manifest failure by the Court to consider material
18 facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the
19 Court before such interlocutory order.”).

20 Civ. Loc. R. 7-9(b)(1)–(3). The EPA relies on no new facts or legal authority to argue that the
21 Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ case for lack of standing. In fact, the Court has not yet ruled on
22 whether Plaintiffs have standing or not, so there is nothing to reconsider. *See* Abeyance Order at 1
23 (“As stated on the record at the August 6, 2020 status conference, the Court believes that there are
24 serious questions regarding whether the named Plaintiffs in this case have standing.”). Indeed, the
25 EPA made the exact same lack of standing argument before the Court issued the abeyance order.
26 *See* Docket Nos. 254 (“Br. on Standing”); 255 (“EPA’s Prop. Findings of Fact”); 260 (“EPA’s
27 Resp. to Pls. Further Statement on New Petition”). That means that the instant motion
28 contravenes Local Rule 7-9(c)’s prohibition against motions for reconsideration that “repeat any
oral or written argument made by the applying party in support of or in opposition to the
interlocutory order which the party now seeks to have reconsidered.” Civ. Loc. R. 7-9(c). Simply
put, the EPA’s motion brings up nothing new. Therefore, reconsideration is not appropriate.

